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Abstract
Part I will examine some salient differences between Rerum Novarum and Centesimus Annus
with respect to the nature of the political state. In Part II, we will take up the problem of rights. In
particular, we shall ask why the encyclical never mentions the term “natural law” even though it
contains several enthusiastic references to natural rights. I conclude by taking a broader measure
of the discussion, especially in terms of the cultural and religious issues.

THE PROBLEM OF THE STATE IN
CENTESIMUS ANNUS*
Russell Hittinger*
INTRODUCTION
At the general audience of May 1, 1991, PopeJohn Paul II
introduced his encyclical letter Centesimus Annus (The Hundredth Year) by pointing out that "[o]ne event seems to dominate the difficult period in which we are living: the conclusion
of a cycle in the history of Europe and the world. The Marxist
system has failed, and precisely for the very reasons which
Rerum Novarum had already acutely and almost prophetically
indicated."' Marxism, the Pope argued, destroyed the institutional prerequisites for economic and political liberty.
On the economic side, the Pope mentioned not only the
"individual's right to private ownership of the means of production," but also, and perhaps more importantly, "the ethical
value of the free market and of entrepreneurial activity within
it. '"2 The Pope warned that whatever kind of political state
emerges in these countries, it must set aside the "over-bureaucratic and centralized command economy."' 3 On the political
and juridical side, John Paul II insisted that "[n]o free economy can function for long and respond to the conditions of a
life more worthy of the human person, unless it is framed in
solid legal and political structures, and above all, unless it is
supported and 'enlivened' by a strong ethical and religious
conscience." ' As the Pope says in the encyclical itself, "these
events are a warning to those who in the name of political real* The author wishes to express his thanks to Michael Novak and Richard John
Neuhaus for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The author is grateful
to Chris Demuth and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research for
the research fellowship that made this Article possible. Finally, special thanks are
due to Jay Aragon~s at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal for his editorial work.
** Associate Professor, School of Philosophy, Catholic University of America,
Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (1991-1993).
1. L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, May 6, 1991, No. 18.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4.Id.
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ism wish to banish law and morality from the political arena." 5
Centesimus Annus is, among other things, a "rereading" of
Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum (New Things), which the
Pope deems a "lasting paradigm" for the church's social teaching.6 Yet, in both the general audience and in the encyclical,
his emphasis upon the events of 1989 indicates that the timing
of this encyclical represents something more than an occasion
for revisiting his predecessor's teachings. Pope John Paul II
stresses the need to take a view of present and future conditions that bespeak "new things" dissimilar to those that prevailed in 1891. For this Pope, the events of 1989 disclose
truths about the human condition that need to be understood
in the context of this historical period-truths that have to be
learned, as he says, in historia,7 or, as he puts its elsewhere in
8
the encyclical, experientia historica.

In light of recent history, two problems in particular
emerge in somewhat sharpened focus: the need, in economics,
to protect non-governmental sources and initiatives, and the
even more pressing need to set juridical limits to the power of
the state. Here, at the outset, it might be helpful to briefly
summarize where the Pope's re-reading of the encyclical tradition bespeaks either new formulations or new applications of
principles.
In Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII contended that private
property must be regarded as a "stable and perpetual," "inviolable," and "sacred" right. 9 Although the notion of property
5. Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus of Pope John Paul II on the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum Novare, § 25 (1991) [hereinafter CA]. An English translation appears in 21 ORIGINS (1991). The Latin text appears in L'OSsERVATORE ROMANO, in
Italia, 2-3 Maggio, 1991. Unless otherwise noted, citations to CA, supra note 5, and
other papal encyclicals follow the convention of citing the section or paragraph

number.
6. CA, supra note 5, §§ 3, 5; see Peter Steinfels, PapalEncyclical Urges to Shed Injustices, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at Al. An encyclical is a major papal statement of
policy and theology, but the adherence it can command among Catholics may vary by
topic. Id.
7. CA, supra note 5, § 31.
8. Id. §41.
9. Rerum Novarum, §§ 6, 15, 46 (1891). Citations to Rerum Novarum and other
Leonine encyclicals are taken from THE CHURCH SPEAKS TO THE MODERN WORLD:
THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF LEO XIII (Etienne Gilson ed., 1954). Concerning the Leonine encyclicals, I am much indebted to the work of Ernest L. Fortin, especially his
article "Sacred and Inviolable" Rerum Novarum and Natural Rights, 53 THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES 203 (1992). This Article is a revised and enlarged version of a paper
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as an ius sanctum was not a new papal teaching," ° Pope Leo's
endorsement of the natural right to private property represented a significant adjustment to the semantics, if not the substance, of modern rights theory. To be sure, the right was contextualized in terms of both the eternal and natural law, as well
as duties to the common good. Rerum Novarum evinces no unqualified approval of what would have been called-either then
or now-"liberalism." The encyclical was issued less than
forty years after Pope Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors (1854), which
declared: "It is an error to believe that the Roman pontiff can
or should reconcile himself to, and agree with progress, liberalism, and modern civilizations."" From all available evidence, Leo XIII regarded the ius sanctum of property as something implicit in the traditional political theory of St. Thomas
Aquinas. The right could be recognized, and indeed emphasized, without in any way conceding a "liberal" doctrine of the
state, or, for that matter, without conceding the religious,
moral, and cultural ideals of liberalism.
Pope Leo's task was to bring what he took to be the tradipresented at the International Conference on Rerum Novarum held at the Lateran University in Rome on May 6-9, 1991. An Italian translation is scheduled to appear in
the Proceedings of the conference. Professor Fortin emphasizes the ways in which
Leo's rhetoric of iura sancta coexisted in a very uneasy tension with the earlier tradition of lex naturalis. In short, Professor Fortin argues that the encyclical tradition,
beginning with Leo, tried to incorporate an unorthodox philosophical doctrine of
natural rights. Leo and his mentors, he suggests, were well-intentioned, but blind to
the theoretical implications of their effort to mix the traditional teachings on natural
law with modern notions of natural rights. We shall pick up this issue later. Here, it
will suffice to say that I emphasize the extent to which Leo's teachings on the political
state remained grounded in the older conception of natural law. While I do not disagree entirely with Professor Fortin's approach (on the uneasy relation between natural law and natural rights), I shall emphasize some very apparent differences between
Leo and the present Pope (on the relation between natural law and the state).
10. On the fourteenth century papal uses of the idea, see RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1979). In the chapter entitled "The First Rights Theory," id. at 5-31, Mr. Tuck argues that the medieval debate over mendicant poverty anticipated modem debates over natural rights. Mr.
Tuck's brief discussion of John XXII's bull Quia vir reprobus (1329) is a particularly
interesting reminder that the notion of property rights as natural dominia did not
originate in seventeenth century liberal theory. On the subject of the late medieval
and early modern sources for natural rights doctrines, see generally MICHEL VILLEY,
LE DROIT ET LES DROITS DE L'HOMME (1983). For both a criticism of Michel Villey and
a survey of contemporary literature on the historical background of the issue, see

Brian Tierney, Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights, in I THE WEIGHTIER
MATTERS OF THE LAw (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 1988).
11. Syllabus of Errors § 69 (1854).
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tional teachings to bear upon the political and economic crises
of the industrial world. On economic matters, he was less interested in understanding the phenomenon of economic freedom on its own terms than he was in asserting moral and juridical principles necessary for answering the twin evils of unrestricted laissez-faire doctrines and state socialism.
In Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul II continues the moral
and juridical language of individual rights, including those pertaining to property. As one commentator accurately stated,
Centesimus is "awash with rights of every kind."'" However, the
Pope also stresses the value of the creativity of work, the production of wealth, and individual access to socio-economic
structures. This Pope is interested in economic liberty on its
own terms. Complementing the older language of rights with
a deeper appreciation of the creativity and institutional dynamisms of the entrepreneurial spirit, he argues that the economic freedoms of the "modern business economy" embody
some of the central virtues of well-ordered liberty.'" The shift
in emphasis from liberty over things (having property and
rights thereto) to liberty in activity (invention of wealth and
participating in markets) gives the Pope the opportunity to advance a moral teaching on economics that more closely corresponds to the empirical and historical realities of modern economic life. Moreover, the emphasis on activity permits a
deeper moral analysis of the virtue of the entrepreneurial
spirit. John Paul's thinking in this area advances, by way of
application, the more theoretical approach he took in the 1981
encyclical Laborem Exercens,' 4 where he investigated the relationship between the creativity of human labor and the traditional understanding of human intelligence as the imago dei. As
Michael Novak has pointed out, this allows the Pope in
Centesimus to relate capital as wealth to capital as creative intelligence. '-5
12. Kenneth Minogue, in The Pope, Liberty, and Capitalism: Essays on Centesimus AnJune 24, 1991, supp. at 8.
13. CA, supra note 5, § 32.
14. See, e.g., Laborem Exercens § 24 (1981).
15. To give credit where it is due, it must be said that Michael Novak's THE
SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (1982) anticipated in some extraordinary ways the
broad lines of this new phase in papal social teaching. Indeed, some sections of
Centesimus Annus can be read as though they were lifted out of the pages of Michael
Novak's work. See, e.g., CA, supra note 5, § 25 ("where self-interest is violently supnus,

NAT'L REV.,

956 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 15:952

It is this Pope's view of the rule of law in the political state,
however, that best represents the evolution in papal teaching
since the late nineteenth century. Centesimus Annus, I shall argue, is the first major encyclical that treats the modern state for
what it is, at least as recent history has disclosed it: namely, a
potentially dangerous concentration of coercive power that requires the most exacting juridical and structural limitations lest
it engulf the economic sphere on the one hand, or the culturalreligious sphere on the other. The political state depicted in
Centesimus Annus is no longer the classical or medieval civitas.
The encyclicals of the Leonine papacy typically treated the
state as a kind of prodigal child of Christendom that needed to
be summoned once again by the Holy See to its proper responsibilities, albeit in the face of certain modern crises. But the
state is still the pre-modern state, pictured as an organic communitas perfecta.16 As Pope Leo XIII put it, the state is "some
likeness and symbol as it were of the Divine Majesty, even
when it is exercised by one unworthy."' 7 The medieval conception of the political state as a privileged participant in divine authority is noticeably absent from Centesimus Annus. This
does not mean that for Pope John Paul II the political state has
no moral tasks, nor does it suggest that these moral tasks are
not derived from God-given norms, both natural and revealed.
These ideas are constantly reasserted in the encyclical. 18 Nevertheless, the Pope regards the state as more of an artificial
pressed, it is replaced by a burdensome system of bureaucratic control which dries up
the wellsprings of initiative and creativity"), § 32 ("besides the earth, man's principle

resource is man himself. His intelligence enables him to discover the earth's productive potential and the many different ways in which human needs can be satisfied. It
is his disciplined work in close collaboration with others that makes possible the creation of ever more extensive working communities which can be relied upon to transform man's natural and human environments. Important virtues are involved in this
process such as diligence, industriousness, prudence in undertaking reasonable risks,
reliability and fidelity in interpersonal relationships as well as courage in carrying out
decisions which are difficult and painful, but necessary both for the overall working
of a business and in meeting possible setbacks"), § 35 ("a society of free work, of

enterprise and of participation"). Mr. Novak's forthcoming book, THE CATHOLIC
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (forthcoming 1992), takes stock of the develop-

ment of papal economic theory from Pope Leo XIII to Pope John Paul II.
16. Rerm Novarum, supra note 9, 99 32, 33. See also THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa
Theologia, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS I-II, question 90 (Anton C.

Pegis ed. & Laurence Shapcote, O.P. trans., 1945).
17. Sapientiae Christianae§ 9 (1890).
18. See, e.g., CA, supra note 5, § 29.
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construct, whose end is to serve the legitimate economic and
cultural interests of individuals and corporate entities that are
irreducible to the state.
It is curious therefore that Professor Kenneth Minogue of
the London School of Economics should contend that the encyclical evinces "a failure of match between the values of a free
society on the one hand, and Aristotelian organicism on the
other."' 9 This "Aristotelian organicism" is precisely what is
absent from Centesimus, and we shall see that its absence is one
of the clearest indicators of the scope of evolution in papal social theory since 1891. Although John Paul II's effort to
demystify the political state stems from his understanding of
the European experience that culminated in the events of
1989, the analysis and correctives provided in Centesimus closely
resemble the modern, Anglo-American understanding of the
political state. The Pope argues, for example, that the state
must be limited by the rule of law, which he equates with (1)
the internal division of powers, according to the various legislative, executive, and judicial organs, and (2) the existence of
individual and corporate rights that limit the application of the
power that can be brought to bear not merely by the offices of
20
the state, but even more significantly by political majorities.
A more careful reading will show that-the limited political institutions and the rule of law are prominent themes in Centesimus
Annus 21

It would be tendentious to interpret the encyclical as a
full-fledged endorsement of "liberalism." Liberalism, of
course, can mean any number of things. It can mean a doctrine of individualism, according to which the well-being of individuals is either the only intrinsically valuable state of affairs,
19. Minogue, supra note 12.
20. CA, supra note 5, § 44.
21. In this respect, Professor John Gray's assessment of the encyclical is as curious as Kenneth Minogue's. Professor Gray maintains that:
The most lasting impression conveyed by the encyclical is of a failure of
perception-a failure to grasp the institutional framework of liberty and
prosperity in the modern world. It is true that the Christian life has flourished, historically, in a diversity of regimes; but all the evidences suggest
that, for us, the civilized life as well as the religious life is possible only in a
civil society that shelters a market economy under a rule of law.
Minogue, supra note 12, at 5. Our reading will show that, in fact, the distinguishing
trait of Centesimus is its focus upon the institutional requirements of liberty.
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or the only such value recognized by government; it can mean
a doctrine of anti-perfectionism, according to which the law
must remain neutral on substantive matters of morality,
neither helping nor hindering the citizens' particular views of
virtue; it can mean a doctrine of individual rights, whereby individual citizens have the capacity to "trump" the enactment of
policies by the majority, no matter the intrinsic merit of the
policies themselves.2 2 Centesimus no more subscribes to these
notions than did Rerum Novarum. But it does endorse the following ideas, all of which can be called, in some appropriately
broad sense, liberal: (1) that, as a basic principle of political
morality, the coercive powers of the state must be limited with
respect to the economic, cultural, and religious activities of its
citizens; (2) that the rule of law takes its meaning not merely
from the need to order and harmonize the citizens of a polity,
but also from the need to limit the power of the state; and (3)
that limits on the power of the state cannot only be structural
in nature, but must also include some rights-based protections
against political majorities.
It should go without saying that any developments in the
Vatican's understanding of the nature of the political state, as
well as its view of the existence and ground of human rights,
are of international significance. In the century encompassed
by the encyclicals (1891-1991), the Catholic Church has found
itself in the unenviable position of maintaining a set of moral,
political, and legal principles in the face of three quite different
political models: (1) the state Marxism of Eastern Europe, (2)
the solidarist conceptions of social justice in the Third World,
and (3) the liberal regimes of the Northern Atlantic world. Addressing these three is no easy task, for it is tempting to speak
either in generalities that are analytically useless, or to speak in
specific terms, that prove either to be interminably controversial, or of limited applicability, depending upon the particular
political, economic, or cultural situation.
Virtually all international bodies subscribe to the ideals of
democracy, constitutionalism, and human rights. These values
22. The position that government must remain neutral with respect to what contributes to, or detracts from, the moral goodness of its citizens is advanced by John
Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, and a host of other Anglo-American theorists. For a useful analysis and criticism of anti-perfectionism, see generally JOSEPH
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
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can be recommended without taking a decisive stand on the
contest among the three models mentioned above. On the
eightieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum, Pope Paul VI issued
Octogesima Adveniens (1971). The encyclical appeared to suggest
a third way between the Marxist and Liberal models, both of
which are put under the rubric of "ideology.

'23

Concerning

liberalism, Pope Paul wrote:
[I]t asserts itself both in the name of economic efficiency,
and for the defense of the individual against the increasingly overwhelming hold of organizations, and as a reaction
against the totalitarian tendencies of political powers....
But do not Christians who take this path tend to idealize
liberalism in their turn, making it a proclamation in favour
of freedom? They would like a new model, more adapted to
present-day conditions, while easily forgetting that at the
very root of philosophical liberalism is an erroneous affirmation of the autonomy of the individual in his activity, his
motivation and the exercise of his liberty.24
Hence, Octogesima not only suggested a moral symmetry between the two ideologies, but also the quest for a Catholic middle way. Although Paul VI noted the pragmatic impetus behind
the liberal option (the legitimate fear of the power of the modem political state), liberalism nonetheless was held to be an
ideology.
While the Catholic Church has persistently delivered its
verdict on the ideologies, until Centesimus it has been reluctant
to do the same at the concrete historical and institutional
levels. Apparently, the events of 1989 have prompted Pope
John Paul II to render the historical and institutional verdict.
This encyclical reaches, much more directly than do any of its
predecessors, the institutional questions of the political and
legal order. It does so more by way of historical than by philosophical reflection. This historical point of view leads Pope
John Paul II to take the impetus toward the liberal position
23. Michael Novak contends that the idea of a Catholic "third way," between
liberalism and socialism, first appeared in Pius XI's QuadragesimoAnno (1931), which
was issued to mark the fortieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum. MICHAEL NOVAK,
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS 111 (2d ed. 1989).
24. Octogesima Adveniens § 35 (1991), translatedin THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE: CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING SINCE POPE JOHN (Joseph Gremillion ed., 1976).
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25
more seriously than his predecessors.
Since many scholars and pundits have already noted how
the scales have been tipped toward liberalism with regard to
the economic issues,2 6 1 shall concentrate upon the problem of
the political state and the rule of law. The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that Centesimus tips the scales toward the
liberal model of the state. I do not offer any extensive analysis
of how the development in the political-legal sphere is related
to the shift in economics. Of course, the two are related, and
we may stipulate that it would be impractical to address the
economic sphere without rethinking the political and legal facets of liberty. I take it for granted that the new perspective on
entrepreneurial activity and the role of markets is but one
piece of a more extensive reconsideration of the state in the
aftermath of the demise of state Marxism.
Nor do I offer extensive analysis of the cultural issues.
Although Centesimus moves decisively toward a liberal model in
the economic and political spheres, the Pope's understanding
of what Michael Novak has called the cultural-religious sphere
hardly can be adjudged "liberal," even on the most benign interpretation of what "liberal" connotes. A central question for
any thoughtful reader of Centesimus is whether it is either theoretically or practically coherent to shift toward a liberal model
of economics and politics, and at the same time hold a rather
traditional understanding of culture. Though I do not try to
resolve this question, I do take note of it throughout this Article. In the conclusion I propose that the "new things" in
Centesimus make the most sense if we suppose that the Pope is
making a bid to protect the Church's traditional cultural mission. That is to say, whatever other merits recommend liberal
economic, political, and legal institutions, the subtext of the

It is interesting that at a 1991 United Nations seminar on the encyclical, it
the delegates from countries such as Italy and Canada, but rather those from
the Slovak Republic, and Nicaragua who focused upon what the encyclical
say about the nature and powers of the political state. U.N. Seminar,
L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Nov. 25, 1991, at 6. The Nicaraguan delegate, Dr. Roberto
Mayorga-Cortes, maintained that the encyclical affirms, against the "enemies" of humanity, (1)"[tihe instrumental and subsidiary character of the state," and (2) "[t]he
principle that true democracy is only possible under the rule of law." Id.

25.
was not
Poland,
has to

26. Much of the initial response is collected in A NEW WORLDLY ORDER: A
"CENrEsIMus ANNUS" READER, (George Weigel ed., 1992). Also see NAT'L REVIEW,
supra note 14; op-ed columns in NAT'L CATH. REP., May 24, 1991, at 31-32.
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Pope's encyclical is the practical value these institutions have
for the protection of religion and culture vis-d-vis the state.
Part I will examine some salient differences between Rerum
Novarum and Centesimus Annus with respect to the nature of the

political state. This comparative analysis will emphasize two
issues: the philosophical and rhetorical differences between
Leo XIII and John Paul II on the nature of the state, and the
quite different historical contexts regarding the problems their
respective encyclicals were meant to address. Then, we shall
examine more carefully this Pope's understanding of limits on
governmental power. Here, two issues are particularly important: first, the manner in which the Pope's view of the political
state sets the terms for his discussion of the rule of law; second, how he distinguishes between the problem of limiting the
state and the more general social and cultural value of solidarity.
In Part II, we will take up the problem of rights. In particular, we shall ask why the encyclical never mentions the term
"natural law" even though it contains several enthusiastic references to natural rights. Although I cannot offer a completely
satisfactory explanation of this shift from natural law to rights,
I propose that it is at least partially intelligible in the context of
the Pope's concern about the problem of state power. I conclude by taking a broader measure of the discussion, especially
in terms of the cultural and religious issues.
I. LIMITS ON THE STATE
At the outset of Centesimus, the Pope takes note of the historical context in which Rerum Novarum was promulgated.
In the sphere of politics, the result of these changes was a
new conception of society and of the state, and consequently of authority itself.2 7 A traditional society was passing away and another was beginning to be formed-one
that brought the hope of new freedoms, but also the threat
of new forms of injustice and servitude. 8
27. "Nova notio societatis et reipublicaefuerat ideoque auctoritatis." For the "state,"
Pope John Paul uses the traditional terms respublica, civitas and status more or less
interchangably. See CA, supra note 5, §§ 11, 15, 35. Note that in this passage, however, he clearly distinguishes between societas and respublica.
28. CA, supra note 5, § 4.
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The problem underscored by Pope John Paul II was not just
Pope Leo's response to the economic crises engendered by industrialization, but a wider and deeper change in the relation
between the state and society, and indeed, in the understanding of political authority itself. The problem of the "limits inherent in the nature of the state" is not only central to the
Pope's exegesis of his predecessor's encyclical of 1891, but
also to his own assessment of the contemporary situation.2 9
The Pope remarks that Leo XIII's encyclical did not depend "on a specific notion of the state or on a particular political theory." 3 0 It is true that the encyclicals of the Leonine papacy frequently mentioned that the Church has no special authority to recommend particular forms of government. 3 ' In
Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII held: "By the State we here understand, not the particular form of government prevailing in this
or that nation, but the State as rightly apprehended; that is to
say, any government conformable in its institutions to right
reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the divine wisdom .. "32 The Catholic Church addresses the necessary
principles, rather than the contingent arrangements of political
order. Pope John Paul restates the same position (absent the
reference to natural law) with regard in Centesimus Annus: "The
church has no models to present; models that are real and
truly effective can only arise within the framework of different
historical situations ....
Insofar as these popes adhere to
the traditional distinction between general principles and prudential applications, their remarks make sense. However, it
cannot be said that they prescind from specific notions or theo"s

29. Id. § 11.
30. Id. § 10.
31. See, e.g., Sapientiae Christianae,supra note 17, § 28:
And since she [the Church] not only is a perfect society in herself, but superior to every other society of human growth, she resolutely refuses,
prompted alike by right and by duty, to link herself to any mere party and to
subject herself to the fleeting exigencies of politics. On like grounds, the
Church, the guardian always of her own right and most observant of that of
others, holds that it is not her province to decide which is the best amongst
many diverse forms of government and the civil institutions of Christian
States, and amid the various kinds of State rule she does not disapprove of
any, provided the respect due to religion and the observance of good morals
be upheld.
32. Rerum Novarum, supra note 9, § 32 (citing Immortale Dei (1885)).
33. CA, supra note 5, § 43.
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ries of the state, and in the case of Centesimus from recommending a particular model-at least for this "historical situation."
Pope Leo's treatment of the state relied upon the traditional language of natural law. By "traditional," I mean the
Thomistic concept of natural law as a participation in the eternal law. 34 Aquinas' method was rather different from Aristotle's. Aristotle contended that " [w]hat is just in the political
sense can be subdivided into what is just by nature and what is
just by convention. What is by nature just has the same force
everywhere and does not depend on what we regard or do not
regard as just." ' Although Aristotle certainly held that there
are natural standards of justice that permit the judgment concerning whether a law is "in accord with nature,"3 6 he did not
predicate a "law" of nature. In short, Aristotle did not compare two kinds of law, but rather compared law to two different
principles: namely, nature and convention (or artifice).3 7
Aquinas, on the other hand, treated natural law as a mode of
divine governance. It is given the status of "law" because nature is legislated by a divine creator and lawgiver; it is "natural" because it denotes a distinction between (1) divine governance via secondary causality and (2) divine governance by
direct or apodictic command, such as in the Decalogue. Thus,
for Aquinas the theme of natural law does not first require a
contrast between human and natural standards of justice, but
rather indicates a contrast between different ways in which
God governs. It is a theological issue, and only derivatively an
anthropological issue.3 8
34. "[T]he light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is
evil, which pertains to the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the
divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law." THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 16, III, question 91, art. 2.
35. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1134b18.
36. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, 1373b6.
37. For a thorough study of the Aristotelian texts on natural justice, see Fred D.
Miller, Jr., Aristotle on NaturalLaw and Justice, in A COMPANION To ARISTOTLE'S POLITics (David Keyt and F.D. Miller, Jr. eds., 1991).
38. Lloyd Weinreb has accurately noted one of the principal differences between
the pre-modern and modern approaches to natural law. LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL
LAW AND JUSTICE 67 (1987). "The puzzles with which Aquinas and others grappled
when they tried to understand the place of humankind in nature appear in other
[modern] guise as part of the effort to describe the relationship of the individual to
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This traditional point of view encourages one to exposit
the themes of law from the top down-from the metaphysical
or theological point of view to the more ordinary political and
legal meanings and applications of the terms. In De Regno, for
example, Aquinas begins his reflections on the duties of the
kingly office by examining the "pattern of the regime of nature" (aforma regiminis naturalis).3 The example for kingship is
taken from the creation of the world (ab exemplo institutionis
mundi)."° In terms of the principles of order, it is said that as
God stands to the multitude of creation, and as the human soul
stands to the material parts of the body, so does the king stand
toward the multitude of citizens. Both rhetorically and philosophically, Pope Leo XIII adhered to this method of exposition. All power of governance, he asserted, "emanate[s] from
God."" It does not derive from consent or contract, but from
God "as from a natural and necessary principle. '4 2 This "necessary principle" is the eternal law, of which the natural law is
our first participation in divine governance. 4 3 Whereas a modern natural law theorist would be inclined to say that the first
limit upon the state is derived from nature (perhaps in the
form of a right or a natural principle of justice), Leo's rendition of the Thomistic participationist scheme emphasizes a descending rather than an ascending order. Nature is not an independent variable; it is not an all-purpose term to be used in
contrast with human artifice. Rather, nature is itself measured
by the divine mind, and expresses to rational creatures the law
and the moral limit of power. The proposition that the origin
and limits of political authority stem from the covenant of
human contractors, or from autonomous "natural" principles
is quite alien to the Leonine encyclicals. Indeed, the notion of
a bottom-up scheme of justification for political authority is
the state." Id. This shift from a cosmological picture of multiple jurisdictions within
a divine commonwealth to a mundane interest in how to order the relationship between the individual and the political state is very much in evidence in Centesimus.
39. De Regno, Ad Regem Cypri, II., question 93, art. 1, translatedin GERALD B. PHELAN, ON KINGSHIP 53 (1949) [hereinafter De Regno].
40. De Regno, supra note 39, at 57.

41. Diuturnum § 12 (1881).
42. Id. § 5; see Libertas Praestantissimum §§ 13, 17 (1888); Immortale Dei, §§ 3, 4
(1885); Rerum Novarum, supra note 9 §§ 7, 52.
43. Immortale Dei, supra note 42, § 30.
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precisely what Pope Leo regarded as the source of the disorder
in European political cultures.
In any event, for Leo, the broad metaphysical and theological scheme remained that of a divine commonwealth in which
the political state had as its principle and end the imitation
(however imperfectly) of God. 44 The state, he said, is a "likeness and symbol as it were of the Divine Majesty." '45 By dint of

participation in God's governance, its ruling powers properly
can be called "sacred." 46 The reference in Rerum Novarum to
property rights as iura sancta notwithstanding, the principal
sanctum in the order of political theory remained the state as a
participator in divine governance-even, he said, when the
power is exercised "by one unworthy." When citizens submit
to the civil authority, they submit to divine authority. 47 On this
view, the traditional Thomistic understanding of natural law
still controls the language of rights, and the picture of a divine
commonwealth, interconnected through various levels of participation in law, controls the notion of authority.4 8 This point
of view persisted in papal encyclicals up to the present timeincluding, Pope John XXIII's Pacem in Terris (1963). 49
While Pope John Paul II is certainly correct when he says
that his predecessor faced radical changes in the notion of authority, it is equally important to bear in mind that Pope Leo
did not give an inch on the older formulation of the authority
of the state. His overwhelming interest was not in the liberal
project of limiting the power of the state, but rather was given
44. Libertas Praestantissimum,supra note 42, § 33.
45. Sapientiae Christianae,supra note 17, § 9.
46. Immortale Dei, supra note 42, § 18.
47. In his early work, Thomas Aquinas allowed the people to depose a tyrant on
any number of conditions. See Scripturm super Libros Sententiarum, II, dist. 44, 2.2.
Later, in De Regno, he argues that this can only be done by a public authority, lest a
worse condition ensue. De Regno, supra note 39, §§ 44, 48. Indeed, he contends that
suffering tyranny can be a punishment for sin. Id. §§ 51-52. It bears mentioning that
when Aquinas wrote this tract, around 1265, dedicated to Hugh II of Cyprus, the
political condition of southern Europe was unstable and subject to internecine struggles. One can imagine the popes of the nineteenth century having a similar view of
the fragmentation of political authority.
48. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of Leo's Libertas Praestantissimum,supra note 42, are perhaps the clearest expression of this scheme.
49. See Pacem in Terris § 47 (1963); PopeJohn XXIII cites Pius XII who said: "the
dignity of the state's authority is due to its sharing to some extent in the authority of
God himself."
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to the project of protecting its majesty and moral ends against
ideologies and social movements that threatened either to
fragment the civitas by subordinating it to private economic interests, or to detach its authority from the broader cosmological order. While it is true that Leo XIII had a keen appreciation of the potential for tyranny in some modern states, 50 and
while he incorporated the modern language of individual
rights as one way of countering disordered political regimes,
his main response was to reassert the model of the divine commonwealth. Indeed, in Rerum Novarum he expressly calls European peoples back to the "primal constitution" of Christian order.5
Centesimus Annus bespeaks a different historical and philosophical view. Besides the fact that John Paul never once mentions the term "natural law" in the encyclical (about which we
shall have more to say later), the "image of God" in Centesimus
is reserved for human persons, invariably in contrast to the
powers of the state:
The root of modern totalitarianism is to be found in the denial of the transcendent dignity of the human person who,
as the visible image of the invisible God, is therefore by his
very nature the subject of rights which no one may violateno individual, group, class, nation or state. Not even the
majority of a social body may violate these rights by going
against the minority, by isolating, oppressing or exploiting
it, or by attempting to annihilate it. 52
Here, there is no theological mantle draped over the state.
Indeed, nowhere in Centesimus can there be found any reference to the political state's imaging of divine governance. This
absence speaks loudly. The first and most persistent limit
upon the state is the "transcendent dignity" of the human person who is the image of God.
The idea that the individual possesses a transcendent dignity is not a novel teaching. However, that this constitutes the
moral basis for limitation of civil power is quite different from
50. Id. § 13.
51. Rerum Novarum, supra note 9, § 27; see also Immortale Dei, supra note 42, § 46
("to endeavor to bring all civil society to the pattern and form of Christianity which
We have described"); Diuturnum, supra note 41, § 22 ("the institution of the Holy
Roman Empire, consecrated the political power in a wonderful manner").
52. See CA, supra note 5, § 44; see id. § 22.
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what was evident in the Leonine approach to these matters.5"
This difference reflects not merely the differences between the
two popes with respect to philosophical method and vocabulary (Leo the Thomist, John Paul the personalist).54 It also
represents substantively different problems that actuate and
orient the two encyclicals. Pope John Paul II does not deal
with the threat to Christian princes, but rather with the threat
to a remnant of Christian culture on the part of totalitarian
states.
In Centesimus Annus, the political state is often described in
forbidding terms. To mention a few such references, Pope
John Paul speaks pejoratively of the "national security state,"
the "social assistance state," "state administration," "state
capitalism," the state as a system of "bureaucratic control,"
and the state as a "secular religion." 55 Whereas Leo XIII was
generally sanguine about the positive role of the political state,
but cautious about modern economic developments, Centesimus
Annus is generally optimistic about the creative dynamisms of
the modern business economy, but palpably suspicious of the
state.
53. Ernest Fortin contends that:
Just as Rerum Novarum bears traces of the transition from late medieval to
early modern thought, i.e. from the divine right of kings to the sacred right
of private property, so Centesimus Annus bears traces of the transition from
early modernity to late modernity, i.e. from the Lockean notion of the sacredness of private property to the eighteenth-century notion of the sacredness of the sovereign individual.
Ernest Fortin, From Rerum Novarum to Centesimus Annus: Continuity of Discontinuity?, 17
FAITH & REASON 412 (1991).

In my view, Professor Fortin correctly perceives the transition in the encyclical
tradition from the Leonine emphasis upon the state to the present pope's emphasis
upon the individual. However, Professor Fortin's interpretation of the Leonine doctrine on property rights is, on my view, overstated. Pope Leo's position is closer to
the model of divinely sanctioned kingship than it is to the Lockean position, according to which the power of the state is limited from below by the rights-bearing, propertied individual.
54. For a useful discussion of contemporary "personalist" theories, and how
they might be distinguished from "liberal" understandings of autonomy and individualism, see YvEs R. SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF AUTHORITY 67-69 (University of
Notre Dame Press 1980) (1962). For a collection of Pope John Paul's locutions on
the subject of human nature, see THE WHOLE TRUTH ABOUT MAN (James V. Schall
ed., 1981). For an analysis of Pope John Paul's "personalism" in areas of moral philosophy and theology, see JANET E. SMITH, HUMANE VITAE: A GENERATION LATER
(1991).

55. CA, supra note 5, §§ 19, 25, 35, 48, 49.
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The reason for this shift in emphasis is no mystery. Leo
lived at the end of an era in which secular ideologies challenged the authority of Christian princes, and both socialism
and radical laissez-faire practices threatened the august responsibilities of the civitas as Leo knew it. John Paul, however,
witnessed the emergence of totalitarian states which conducted
a policy of "total war" within and without.5 6 They obliterated
the conditions of economic development, the rule of law, and
the cultural dimension of Christianity. The modern state (of
the sort criticized by John Paul) has not so much defaced the
political image of divine governance vested in the civil authority, but has attacked the image as it subsists in human persons.
Hence, where Leo was interested in reconnecting the civil authority to the proper understanding of divine governance
under the eternal law, John Paul emphasizes the need to
ground the state in a proper understanding of the human person. Whether in the areas of economics, law, or politics, he
emphasizes that the root cause of totalitarianism is a false anthropology. 7
How is the state to be limited? It is one thing to speak of
limits drawn from very general first principles, but it is another
thing to address the specifically political and institutional levels
of the problem. Centesimus Annus continues the papal teaching
regarding the principle of subsidiarity, a principle drawn not
from Leo XIII, but from Pius XI's QuadragesimoAnno (1931). In
fact, John Paul's most pointed and critical remarks about the
welfare state are made in the light of that principle.5 8 The
Pope is exceedingly critical of bureaucracies that, however
well-intentioned, tend to undermine local initiatives and responsibilities in economic matters. Interestingly, when
Centesimus addresses the problem of the relation between the
state and the poor and vulnerable, it more often speaks of the
juridical responsibility to protect rights rather than a responsi56. Id. § 14.
57. See, e.g., id. §§ 11, 13, 46.
58. "Here again, the principle of subsidiarity must be respected: A community
of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower
order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of
need and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always
with a view to the common good." Id. § 48 (citing Quadragesimo Anno); see id. §§ 10,
15, 49.
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bility to engage in administrative interventions.5 9 While the
state has a responsibility to oversee and direct the exercise of
economic rights, the "primary responsibility in this area belongs not to the state, but to individuals and to the various
groups and associations which make up society."' 60 Significantly, the Pope maintains that the decentralization of power
and responsibility promotes greater productivity and efficiency, "even though it may weaken consolidated power structures. ' 61
The Pope's assessment of the welfare state has drawn immediate comment from the political and public policy sectors.
U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed:
What we have here is a considerable role reversal. A century ago, addressing the social question of that time... the
church called for more intervention by the state. Now it appears to be saying that the state intervention has to some
extent created or at least worsened 62the social problems of
the present age. This is high irony.
The Rev. J. Bryan Hehir also expresses perplexity about the
implications of the encyclical's criticism of the welfare state:
This critique [of the welfare state] is puzzling, however, because the range of activities that Catholic teaching, including this encyclical, require the state to perform, particularly
in defense of the poor, is usually identical with the role "the
welfare state" has fulfilled in many industrialized democracies. It would not be surprising if critics of these functions
try to5 use this language to limit the state's role in the future.

6

These comments are accurate insofar as they note a
change of emphasis in Centesimus. But the papal remarks on the
welfare state should be regarded as instances of a broader reconsideration of limits on the state itself. In fact, the Pope indicates that the principle of subsidiarity needs to be seen
afresh, in the light of the contemporary need to limit state
59. Id. § 10.
60. CA, supra note 5, § 48.
61. Id. §43.
62. SocialJustice in the Next Century, AMERICA, Sept. 14, 1991, at 137.
63. Reordering the World:John Paul H's "Centesimus Annus", COMMONWEAL, June 14,
1991, at 394. However, it is not critics, but the Pope himself who appears to have this
in mind. See infra text accompanying note 67.
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power: "The relevance of these reflections [concerning subsidiarity] for our own day is inescapable. It will be useful to
return later to this important subject of the limits inherent in
the nature of the state." 4
Regarding the reconsideration of limits upon the state, a
crucial text is found at section forty-four, where the Pope
writes:
[i]n one passage of Rerum Novarum [Pope Leo XIII] presents
the organization of society according to the three powerslegislative, executive and judicial-something which at the
time represented a novelty6 5 in church teaching. Such an
ordering reflects a realistic vision 66 of man's social nature,
which calls for legislation capable of protecting the freedom
of all. To that end, it is preferable that each power be balanced by other powers and by other spheres of responsibility which keep it within proper bounds. This is the principle
of the 'rule of law' 67 in which the law is sovereign, and not
the arbitrary will of individuals.6"
"In modern times," he adds, "this concept has been opposed by totalitarianism, which in its Marxist-Leninist form
maintains that some people, by virtue of a deeper knowledge
of the laws of the development of society ...are exempt from
error."69
The first point to be noticed is that John Paul not only
presents this conception of the powers of the state as a "novel"
teaching, he also credits it to Pope Leo. In this, he is mistaken,
but it is an interesting mistake.7" Centesimus cites sections
64. CA, supra note 5, § 11. Ad grave autem argumentum limitum Status ipsius naturae
ingenitorum redire decebit postmodum. On the Pope's cautious approach to state welfare,
see the Papal address to industrial and farm labour representatives in Matera, Italy.
19, May 1991.
L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO,
65. Novum.
66. Ad veritalem versum ostendit.
67. "Civitatis iuris " principium.
68. CA, supra note 5, § 44.
69. Id.
70. It is not clear why John Paul imputes this idea to Leo XIII. Peter Hebblewaite has complained that John Paul has an overblown estimation "of the importance and influence of Rerum Novarum .... It would be much better if we stopped
talking about 'Catholic social doctrine' as if it were some kind of river majestically
sweeping down through history." Peter Hebblewaite, Big news isthat encyclical voted for
Democracy, NAT'L CATH. REP., May 24, 1991, at 31. Section 44 of Centesimus perhaps is
an instance where the Pope's rhetoric obscures rather than illuminates the difference
between himself and his predecessor.
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thirty-two and thirty-three of Rerum Novarum as the textual
source for the notion of the division of governmental powers.
Yet it is precisely in these sections that we find the most potent
expression of Leo's affinity for the medieval organic view of
political society. Here, Pope Leo cites, as a framework for the
notion of distributive justice, Thomas Aquinas's dictum: "As
the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, so that
which belongs to the whole in a sense belongs to the part."'"
Read in context, this is not even remotely similar to John
Paul's notion of limiting the state by means of a pragmatic allocation of its powers, much less an equation between such an
arrangement and the rule of law.
The second point to be noticed about this text is that the
"rule of law" reflects the point made earlier about the absence
of the organic metaphors for the state in Centesimus. We notice
in section forty-four, for instance, that the check upon the
power of the state is not drawn from an understanding of the
hierarchical and organic distinction between the parts of the
whole. It is taken from a "realistic" understanding of structural limitations which ought to constitute the very institutional form of the state. Although the division of powers can
be interpreted as something complementary to the older organic model, the equation of such structural limits with the
"rule of law" is modern.72 It is modern not only with respect
to its historical pedigree in eighteenth century republicanism,
but also with respect to its function. One speaks of the division
of powers not for the purpose of providing a picture of how
the individual members are, by nature, distinguished and fitted
to the body, but rather to ameliorate potential abuses of civil
power.
Therefore, it is human artfulness, tempered and guided by
historical learning about abuses of power, and not the imitation of natural hierarchies, that sets the terms of the discussion
71. See Rerum Novarum, supra note 9, 33 (citing THOMAS AQuINAS, SUMMA THEsupra note 16, I-I1, question 61, art. 1, ad. 2).
72. The 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, for example, stated that: "A society in which rights are not secured nor the separation of
powers established is a society without a constitution."
16. For a discussion of
differences among eighteenth century American and Continental versions of separation of powers, see FOREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 81-85 (1985).
OLOGIA,
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in section forty-four. We notice that the Pope criticizes Marxism, for claiming to govern according to an indefectible knowledge of "deeper laws," and for eschewing any realistic sense of
the imperfectibility of human institutions. The structural division of the civil potestas is not a necessary metaphysical principle. Nor does it flow from a knowledge of "deeper laws."
Rather, it is learned by trial and error. Among the many philosophical errors John Paul attributes to modern totalitarians, he
notes in section forty-four that they took themselves to be "exempt from error."
By emphasizing the pragmatic and historically conscious
cast of the Pope's remarks, I do not mean to slight his equally
emphatic remarks about the philosophical failure of Marxism.
In section forty-four, as elsewhere, he says that the "root failure" of modern totalitarianism is its rejection of the "transcendent dignity" of the rights-bearing human person. 7 1 "Authentic democracy," he warns, "is possible only in a state ruled by
law and on the basis of a correct conception of the human person." 7 4 Therefore, it would be a one-sided interpretation of
Centesimus to reduce the issue of the political state exclusively
to the pragmatic view of human fallibility, or to the procedural,
in contrast to the substantive, facets ofjustice. The Pope's understanding of what is entailed (not merely privately, but publicly) in the "correct conception" of the human person is not
apt to satisfy a liberal proceduralist. 75 Nevertheless, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, however adamant
John Paul is about the importance of timeless truths, much of
what this encyclical has to say about political and legal institutions is not drawn from philosophy, but rather is taken from an
experimental and historical assessment of the conduct of modern governments. To put it in another way, a correct conception of history seems to be at least as important in setting the
agenda of Centesimus-at least on the issue of political institu73. CA, supra note 5, § 44.
74. Id. § 46.
75. See, e.g., Milton's Friedman's comment: "But I must confess that one highminded sentiment, passed off as if it were a self-evident proposition, sent shivers
down my back: 'obedience to the truth about God and man is the first condition of
freedom.' Whose 'truth'? Decided by whom? Echoes of the Spanish Inquisition?"
Milton Friedman, in The Pope, Liberty, and Capitalism, supra note 12, at 4.
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tions-as any particular formulation of the "correct" view of
the human person.
Earlier, we took exception to Professor Kenneth Minogue's contention that the encyclical evinces "a failure of
match between the values of a free society on the one hand,
and Aristotelian organicism on the other."' 76 How, then, do we
reconcile the claim that Centesimus Annus eschews organic metaphors for the state with the ideal of "solidarity," which is also
evident in the pages of the encyclical? Can the encyclical espouse a liberal (or at least a quasi-liberal) view of the political
state, and at the same time speak of social and economic activity implying an "expanding chain of solidarity"?
Man works in order to provide for the needs of his family,
his community, his nation and ultimately all humanity.
Moreover, he collaborates in the work of his fellow employees as well as in the work of suppliers and in the customers'
use of
goods in a progressively expanding chain of solidar77
ity.

One thing that has been learned by this Pope is the inevitability of conflict.7 8 Conflict in the economic and social sectors is not necessarily a per se disordered phenomenon. The
encyclical recognizes that some states will be religiously pluralistic, and will have to negotiate such differences according to
juridically recognized rights. 79 It is not conflict that is necessarily evil, but rather conflicts which escalate into "total war"that is to say, conflicts which are not "constrained by ethical or
juridical consideration for the dignity of others." 8 ° John Paul's
emphasis on the rule of law, externally regulating conflicts,
stands in tension with, but does not contradict, his notion of a
"civilization of love."'8' The state's principal task is to determine the "juridical framework" of economic and social activities. 2 It encourages solidarity only in an indirect manner. In
76. Minogue, supra note 12.
77. CA, supra note 5, § 43.
78. Id. § 5 ("This doctrine is likewise a source of unity and peace in dealing with
the conflicts which inevitably arise in social and economic life.").
79. Id. § 29.
80. Id. § 14.

81. Id.§ 10 (citing Pope Paul VI, message for the 1977 World Day of Peace (Jan.
1, 1977)).
82. CA, supra note 5, §§ 15, 48.
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short, the rule of law is not the same principle as solidarity.
In the encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987), the term solidarity is used by John Paul to denote various kinds of "collaboration" among individuals and states.8 3 However, in Sollicitudo
he also places solidarity into tension with freedom: "In order
to be genuine, development must be achieved within the
framework of solidarity and freedom, without ever sacrificing
either of them under whatever pretext. '"84 Here, the Pope distinguishes between the principle of social and affective unity
whereby persons collaborate toward common ends, and the
principle of freedom. This tension is maintained in Centesimus.
The state is not the Balm of Gilead that reconciles every manner of dispute. Rather, the political state establishes the broad,
juridical conditions of justice within which solidarity can develop.8 5 This corresponds to what we said earlier about the
non-organicity of the state. In contrast to the classical or medieval conception of the civitas, the state in Centesimus is not the
locus or principal expression of cosmic harmony. The state is
not to be commissioned to smooth over the rough and tumble
of economic and religious differences. Nor does it sacrifice the
shaggy and incomplete dynamisms of economic activity to consolidated state power. John Paul recognizes that once it is submitted to proper limits, the power of the state will be weakened.8 6
Cultural, familial, economic, and religious activities are ordained to "solidarity" Of various sorts. The Pope speaks explicitly of the "family, and other intermediate communities" as
having the primary function of giving life to "specific networks
of solidarity."8a8 The state, on the other hand, is obligated to
protect the rights of citizens to engage in these activities.
Throughout the encyclical the Pope invariably reserves the juridical language for the state's dealings with its citizens, and
does not confuse it with the societal and cultural spheres in
which the language of solidarity is most appropriate.8 8 The
Pope writes:
83. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis § 39 (1987).
84. Id. § 33.

85. CA, supra note 5, § 25.
86. Id. § 43.
87. Id. § 49.
88. For the contrast between solidarity and the state, see id. § 41.
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According to Rerum Novarum and the whole social doctrine
of the church, the social nature of man is not completely
fulfilled by the state, but is realized in various intermediary
groups, beginning with the family and including economic,
social, political and cultural groups which stem from human
nature itself and have their own autonomy, always with a
view to the common good. This is what I have called the
"subjectivity" of society which, together with the subjectiv89
ity of the individual, was canceled out by "real socialism."
This text can be taken as but one piece of evidence that
John Paul maintains a sufficiently clear distinction between the
structures of the state and the "subjectivity" of society. The
political state is not the only, or for that matter, even the privileged, locus of the common good. In the older framework of
Leo XIII, one could have recognized part of this: namely, that
the political state incorporates different levels of social functions. Because the civitas is a natural hierarchy, the internal
parts are ordered in an asymmetrical fashion. That is to say,
the parts are not substitutable. But on Pope Leo's view, the
parts nevertheless are ordered to the state as to the common
good. Again, it is precisely because of this ordering that the
state enjoys its august authority. While not denying the notion
of a common good, Pope John Paul II stops short of magnetizing around the state the various levels and meanings of the
common good.
Throughout Centesimus, for example, the Pope speaks of
religion as the very centerpiece of culture, intersubjectivity,
and solidarity. 9° Yet this kind of solidarity is not identified
with the state. Rather, religious liberty, protected by juridical
rights, is "the primary foundation of every authentically free
political order."'" The external order ofjustice, for which the
state is responsible, is "primary" in a very narrow and specific
sense. It facilitates the myriad of cultural, religious, and social
activities which bring about the solidarist ends which, according to the Pope, are in accord with the social nature of man.
While this point of view does not represent a retreat from the
traditional Catholic understanding of the common good, it
does bespeak a more nuanced, and in some important re89. Id. § 13 (citation omitted).
90. CA, supra note 5, §§ 24, 29.
91. Id. § 29 (citation omitted).
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spects, liberal understanding of the role of the state.
John Paul's stringent attention to the structural limits of
the state, his careful efforts to distinguish its sphere from the
social, economic, and religious life, as well as his persistent endorsement of individual rights against the state, must be regarded as a rejection of liberation theologians such as Gustavo
Gutierrez who deny the "distinction of planes."19 3 That is to
say, Centesimus maintains clearly drawn lines between the economic, political, and social spheres. Critics of liberalism, from
both the left and the right, have sought to blur these lines,
either in the name of an older hierarchical organicism, or in
the name of a revolutionary ideal. In North America, for ex-

ample, theorists in the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") movement have contended that law is politics, and that politics
serves the transformation of society, ultimately toward solidarity.

94

CLS theorists regard the institutional distinction between
law and politics as a stratagem for shielding the vested power
of elites, by making the law relatively immune from social
struggles.9 5 Roberto Unger, for instance, has contended that
92. Michael Novak has pointed to a chief difference between "solidarist methods" (whether of the left or right) and the institutional procedures of liberal regimes.
NOVAK, supra note 23, at 117. Whereas solidarist approaches to the common good
envisage the public authority "suffused throughout the society from above," the liberal approach emphasizes multiple and coordinate perspectives. Id. In this light, the
traditional papal doctrine of subsidiarity is amenable to two quite different views of
institutions. If we take the older understanding of organic hierarchies, the principle
of subsidiarity re-emphasizes the notion of those proper analogies which obtain between the various levels of the body politic. Solidarity could be said to suffuse the
entire body, but enacted in analogically different ways. If, however, we take the perspective of liberal institutions, the sectors are more sharply differentiated. Even the
powers of the state are to be divided. The organic idea of one power subsisting in
another is jettisoned in favor of the idea of externally coordinated powers. Although
the term "subsidiarity" has better semantical fit
with the former, the latter perspective is also a method of satisfying the principle.
93. GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION 47 (1977).
94. Duncan Kennedy's remark epitomizes this rejection of the distinction between law and politics: "Teachers teach nonsense when they persuade students that
legal reasoning is distinct, as a method for reaching correct results, from ethical or
political discourse in general. . . . There is never a 'correct legal solution' that is
other than the correct ethical or political solution to that legal problem." Duncan
Kennedy, Legal Education as Training For Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 47 (David

Kairys ed., 1982).
95. For a summary of this position, see ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1983). The best overall assessment of movement is Andrew Altman's critical, but fair, work in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990).
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the classical liberal technique of dividing government into
three coordinate branches is "dangerous," because it "generates a stifling and perverse institutional logic." 9 6 He recommends that a fourth branch of government be created-a
branch whose function it would be to constantly transform social life.
[T]he power responsible for systematic interventions
should be a branch apart, staffed and organized according
to the principles most suitable to its overriding task....
They should have at their disposal the technical, financial,
and human resources required by any effort to reorganize
major institutions and to pursue the reconstructive effort
over time. Such a branch of government must have a wide
latitude for intervention. Its activities embrace, potentially,
every aspect of social life and every function of all the other
powers in the state. If the other powers could not resist and
invade the jurisdiction of this corrective agency, it would
become the overriding authority in the state. 9 7
This can be taken as a North American token of the radical
model of the state that the Vatican has faced in its dealings
with activists and theologians in Latin America and in the
Third World, where the quest for social justice deliberately neglects structural and rights-based limits upon the manner in
which political power can be used to achieve human ends.
As Professor Paul Sigmund has observed,
[i]t is ironic, therefore, that at the very time when the Roman Catholic church (in Pacem in Terris-1963-and during
and after the Second Vatican Council) had finally come to
endorse human rights.., an important sector of its intellectual elite not only ignored them, but even took an approach
undermining the theoretical basis for their teachings.9"
To deny the distinction of planes, and, correlatively, to deny a
principled distinction between law and politics, is tantamount
to rejecting the liberal ideal of structural and rights-based limits on the state. Insofar as the public rhetoric of the Catholic
96. ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN
THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 449 (1987).
97. Id. at 453.
98. PAUL E. SIGMUND, LIBERATION THEOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY
OR REVOLUTION? 77 (1990). Paul Sigmund's discussion of liberation theology as a
reaction and reformist liberalism appears id. at 189-98.
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Church for several decades has endorsed democracy and individual rights, it still had to recognize more explicitly the institutional logic of that commitment. In the context of modem
constitutionalism, the division of state powers and the existence ofjuridically recognized individual rights do not so much
suggest the moral ends of politics, as they indicate the proper
means by which those ends are secured. It is precisely this recognition that animates Centesimus, and sets it against the radical
solidarist position. If we prescind from the encyclical's misgivings about the moral and cultural aspects of the liberal model,
and attend narrowly to the political and legal issues, Centesimus
implicitly rejects any notion of a "third way." There simply is
no other kind of political state that fits the bill of particulars
enunciated in this encyclical than what we have called the "liberal" model.
Centesimus, therefore, not only represents considerable development with regard to the older political model of organic
hierarchies, in which the political civitas epitomizes the common good. It is also opposed to the liberationist effort to cancel the "distinction of planes" regarding (1) government and
society, and (2) law and solidarity. The encyclical is not a "liberal" account of the destiny of man, but it does reflect the hard
won historical lessons of liberal political institutions.
II. RIGHTS-BASED LIMITS UPON THE STATE
The Church's declaration on religious liberty, Dignitatis
Humanae, and the encyclical Pacem in Terris, are mileposts in the
Church's pronouncements on human rights. 9 9 Dignitatis sanctioned the principle of the right to religious liberty. In terms
of both its theoretical and practical implications, it can be regarded as the most important pronouncement by the post-war
Catholic Church on the subject of rights. The movement toward a liberal conception of political and juridical institutions
is at least germinally contained in Dignitatis. The chief contribution of Pacem in Terris was the exposition and organization of
rights in the form of a bill of rights.
The expansive nature of rights language in the post-war
encyclicals and pronouncements indicates a considerable
99. See DignitatisHumanae (1965); Pacem in Terris (1963). Citations are to the verTHE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE, supra note 24.

sion printed in
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change from the pre-war encyclicals. Of course, Pope Leo XIII
insisted on the importance of natural rights, and may fairly be
credited with making the idea a more or less permanent fixture
in papal social encyclicals. Yet something important changed
after World War II. Papal and ecclesial documents began to
speak of rights in the terms of the ideal of modern constitutionalism. Both DignitatisHumanae and Pacem in Terris explicitly
refer to rights in the context of modern constitutional and juridical limits upon the political state.' 0 0
No doubt, there are many reasons for this expansion of
rights discourse, and of lists that resemble "bills of rights."
The Catholic Church appropriated the language used not only
by international bodies like the United Nations, but also by the
Western allies who subdued the dictatorships after World War
II. On another level, however, the Church's appropriation of
rights language reflects the process of historical learning. Prewar popes such as Pius XI understood liberalism to be a doctrine of untrammeled individualism that destabilizes the political state, and hence leads to totalitarianism and international
conflict. The post-war interest in individual rights can be attributed to the gradual recognition that a rights-based constitutionalism is a historically proven way to limit the power of
the state.
Pope John Paul II says that the Church's defense and promotion of human rights is one of its "important and even decisive contributions" to the promising events of recent years.' 0 '
The issue of individual rights is not a minor theme in Centesimus
Annus. The "root" perversion of totalitarianism, the Pope argues, was disrespect for the human person as the "subject of
rights." 10 2 He described the workers' movement in Poland as
a movement for "the liberation of the human person and for
the affirmation of rights;"'' 0 3 and the emergent democracies
are urged to reform their systems "to give democracy an authentic and solid foundation through the explicit recognition
'0 4
of ... rights."'
What are these rights? In Centesimus, the Pope does not
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 99, § 1, pt. 27.
CA, supra note 5, § 22.
Id. § 44.
Id. § 26.
Id. § 47.
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clearly distinguish between their different genera and species.
Rather, he appears to use an all-purpose language of natural
rights. In some places, he speaks of iurafundamentalia(fundamental rights), 10 5 iura hominis (rights of man), °6 and of iura...
ab ea abalienari (inalienable rights).'0 7 Elsewhere, he refers to
one or another right as a ius naturae (right of nature),l108 or a/us
ad autoniam (a right to autonomy).l09 Of course, a fundamental
right need not be the same as a natural right, and all natural
rights need not be seen as inalienable rights. The language is
not as precise as that which we would expect in an academic
treatise or legal brief. This problem notwithstanding, it is generally clear that the Pope has in mind rights that are in one or
another sense antecedent to political society."l 0 He follows
not only what he takes to be the usage customary since Pope
Leo XIII, but also the mandate of canon law. The Codex Iuris
Canonici (1983) maintains that:
To the Church belongs the right always and everywhere to
announce moral principles, including those pertaining to
the social order, and to make judgments on any human affairs to the extent that they are required by the fundamental
rights of the human person [quatenus personae humanae iura
fundamentalia] or the salvation of souls."'
These iura fundamentalia might include natural rights, or for
105. Id. § 6.
106. CA, supra note 5, § 22.
107. Id. § 7.
108. Id.
109. Id. § 30.
110. Id. § 7.
111. Codex luris Canonici, canon 747/2 (1983). It is interesting that the canon
does not contend that the Catholic Church has authority to interpret and to teach the
natural law. This represents a profound shift of perspective. It makes some sense to
say that the Church has authority to interpret the natural law, for on the traditional
view, the law of nature is a mode of divine governance. As Aquinas argued in the
Summa Theologiae, sin had corrupted the human ability to make certain and full use of
the natural law, and therefore God re-promulgated the conclusiones of the natural law
in the Decalogue. In turn, the precepts of the Decalogue are completed and fully
ordered by the ex nova, the new law of grace. THOMAS AqUINAS, supra note 16, I-1I,
questions 100-08. Theologically speaking, the Church would have a plausible claim
to interpret the natural law by dint of the authority invested in the Church by divine
positive law and by grace. But the term iurafundamentaliacan be construed to mean
human rights, of the sort recognized in the positive law of constitutions. Does the
Church have any special insight at this level?
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that matter, particularly important legal and constitutional
rights.
There is no need here to extract a complete list of the
rights mentioned in Centesimus. They are enumerated in more
than one place in the encyclical. Sometimes the Pope refers to
the rights announced in Rerum Novarum, while in other places
he enumerates rights in light of the events of 1989. But he
also refers to rights affirmed by various international bodies, as
well as rights mentioned in one or another papal encyclical or
conciliar document. Taken together, and with some editing on
our part in order to indicate the range and diversity of the
rights, a short list includes the following:
*right and duty to seek God, to know him and to live in
accordance with that knowledge;' 12
*rights to private initiative, to ownership of property
and to freedom in the economic sphere; ' 3
*right to express one's own personality at the workplace without suffering any affront to one's conscience and
personal dignity;' '4
1 15
eright to private associations;
l6
*right to life;"
*right to live in a united family and in a moral environment conducive to the growth of the child's personality;''
*right to develop one's intelligence
and freedom in
8
truth;"
the
knowing
and
seeking
eright to share in the work which makes wise use of the
9
earth's material resources."
What is the order and ground of these rights? Perhaps the
most surprising aspect of Centesimus Annus is the absence of any
explicit reference to "natural law." Pope Leo XIII might have
been surprised to discover that the encyclical celebrating and
recapitulating the centennial anniversary of Rerum Novarum had
nothing to say about natural law. Pacem in Terris, which con112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

CA, supra note 5, §§ 29, 47 (citation omitted).
Id. §24.
Id. § 15.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 47.
CA, supra note 5, § 47.
Id.
Id.
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tains the most extensive papal compilation of natural rights,
was careful to claim that the rights are derived from God via
the natural law: "[R]ights as well as duties find their source,
their sustenance and their inviolability in the natural law which
grants or enjoins them."' 2 ° Dignitatis Humanae affirmed the
existence of a fundamental right to religious liberty. The move
in Centesimus toward the liberal model of the state would be unthinkable without the earlier groundwork laid in Dignitatis.
Nevertheless, Dignitatis retained the traditional language of the
eternal and natural laws:
[T]he highest norm of human life is the divine law-eternal,
objective, and universal-whereby God orders, directs, and
governs the entire universe and all the ways of the human
Man
community, by a plan conceived in wisdom and love.
2
has been made by God to participate in this law.' '
Whether or not Leo XIII would have approved of
Dignitatis, he certainly would have recognized its philosophical
vocabulary. How are we to interpret Centesimus in this regard?
Does the absence of explicit reference to natural law represent
a rhetorical anomaly or oversight, or does it bespeak a substantive position? Having jettisoned the older participationist
model of the political state, has the Pope has taken the next
step, which is to drop the metaphysical language of natural law
associated with that model, in favor of an all-purpose language
of natural rights that covers everything from the desiderata of
international legal bodies to the bills of rights in particular
constitutions? An alert reader can find bits and pieces of natural law language in Centesimus. In one place, the Pope says that
man "must therefore respect the natural and moral structure
with which he has been endowed."'' 2 2 In section twenty-nine,
the Pope refers to "truth, both natural and revealed."'' 21 The
context for his remark in this section, however, is the need for
individual rights, such as those recognized by international
120. Pacem in Terris, supra note 99, pt. 28.
121. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 99, § 3.
122. "Observanda structura naturalis et moralis qua est donatus." CA, supra note 5,
§ 38. The meaning of the conjunctive "et" is unclear. John Paul does not say the
"natural moral structure."
123. Id. § 29.
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covenants like the Helsinki Accords. 2 4 In section thirteen, he
refers to the various intermediary groups which stem "from
human nature."' 125 But here, he immediately introduces his
own philosophical language of the "subjectivity of the individual." Indeed, where Leo XIII gave a natural law analysis of the
right to human association, based upon the natural ordination
to society-"all striving against nature is in vain" 26 -Pope
John Paul II refers not to the teleological thrust of nature, but
to the inherent autonomy, subjectivity, and dignity of the individual. Section thirteen deserves closer attention, for it clearly
marks John Paul's substitution of theological personalism for
the older natural law language.
The context of section thirteen is the problem of the atheistic, socialist state. Socialism, he writes, reduces man to "a
series of social relationships, and the concept of the person as
the autonomous subject of moral decision disappears, the very
subject whose decisions build the social order."'' 27 "From this
mistaken conception of the person," he continues, "there arise
both the distortion of law, which defines the sphere of the ex' 28
ercise of freedom, and an opposition to private property."'
Reducing the individual to the "social machine and [to] those
who control it,' ' 129 socialism violates not only the dignity of the

individual, but also subverts the social order that is built upthe Pope uses the word "progress"-by the freedom of individual decisions and activities. Turning to the social nature of
the individual, the Pope argues that the "social nature of man
is not completely fulfilled by the state, but is realized in various
intermediary groups . . . which stem from human nature it-

self."' 3 ° Given the autonomy and subjectivity of the individual, his social relations
can be described as having a certain
3
"[inter] subjectivity."' '1

We notice, in the first place, that law defines the sphere of
the exercise of freedom. Once again, this reflects the general
124.
1975, 14
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1,
I.L.M. 1292.
CA, supra note 5, § 13 (ex hominis natura orientes).
Reumn Novarum, supra note 9, § 17.
CA, supra note 5, § 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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commitment throughout the encyclical to the theme of protecting individual and corporate liberties against the political
state. In the second place, although the Pope speaks of the
intermediary societies stemming from nature, the context appears to emphasize "nature" in terms of the subjectivity and
dignity of the individual, who builds the social order. The
Pope does not go so far as to say that the social order is created, whole cloth, out of individual decisions. Yet the argument does appear to favor a more modern, if not liberal, conception of civil society as constituted by individual freedom.
And in this, we find a clear departure from the traditional natural law conception of civil society which, in the order of final
causality, is prior to the individual. The argument as a whole
needs to be read as the groundwork for a defense of rights
against the political state.
Comparing Leo and John Paul, Professor Fortin conjectures, on the basis of section thirteen, that Leo perhaps would
be surprised by "John Paul II's unprecedented insistence on
the more or less Kantian notion of the 'dignity' that is said to
accrue to the human being, not because of any actual conformity with the moral law, but for no other reason than that he is
an 'autonomous subject of moral decision.' "132 Professor Fortin is right to note the importance of the Kantian-like language
of autonomy. This language is alien to Leo's philosophical and
theological sensibilities. But it is not quite accurate to suggest
that the human person, in Centesimus, has autonomy with regard to the divine image, from which the dignity accrues. Indeed, one of the most perplexing issues posed by the encyclical is whether the case for human dignity, rights, and duties is
exclusively theological. In the conclusion of section thirteen,
for example, the Pope maintains that the source of the mistaken conception of the person is "atheism." "It is by responding to the call of God contained in the being of things
that man becomes aware of his transcendent dignity," and
"[t]he denial of God deprives the person of his foundation and
consequently leads to a reorganization of the social order with33
out reference to the person's dignity and responsibility."'1
132. Fortin, supra note 53.
133. CA, supra note 5, § 13.
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Does this mean that human rights require the recognition of
their revealed theistic ground?
There can be no question but that the Pope wants to discuss these matters in the light of a theocentric anthropologyman as the image of God. The truth about man is a central
theme to which the issues of rights, markets, and the state are
subordinated. Inasmuch as one believes that there is an objective morality based upon the truth about human nature, one
could be said to have a natural law position.' 3 4 Centesimus, however, appeals to a very particular truth about human naturenamely, the revealed theology of the Scriptures and Catholic
dogma. The need to ground rights in a theistic view of human
nature is a disputed issue in the history of philosophy. The
point to be made here is that Centesimus does not shed any light
on this disputed question.
Although the text of Centesimus Annus simply does not provide us with a sure way to answer the question about natural
law and the ground of rights, we can make three observations
which might help to clarify the matter. The first two involve
issues that straddle the line of rhetoric and substance; the third
pertains directly to the problem of limits upon the state.
In the first place, since the pontificate of Pope John XXIII,
the popes have been cognizant of the danger that the term
"natural law" will be construed to mean the sub-human regularities and predictabilities of physical nature-that is to say,
"natural laws" as they are understood by the modem sciences.' 5 Although Americans perhaps are more liable to recognize the connection between "natural law" and the so-called
"higher law" (rather than a lower, biological law), this is not
necessarily so for Europeans. Perhaps this is due to the prominence of natural law in the U.S. Declaration of Independence,
in the abolitionist discussion leading to the adoption of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitu134. Perhaps this is why Professor Arthur Utz, at the University of Fribourg, has
said that the topic of natural law is "re-examined by John Paul II throughout the
Encyclical." Arthur Utz, Centesimus Annus, L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, July 15, 1991.
COMMONWEAL might be closer to the truth, however, when it pointed out that the
Pope puts forward a "case for human rights based on faith in revealed truth about the
transcendent nature of human life." After Communism, COMMONWEAL, June 1, 1991, at

356. On the problem of how natural law has become equated with moral objectivism,
see my article, Varieties of Minimalist Natural Law Theory, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 133 (1989).
135. See Pacem in Teris, supra note 99, §§ 4-7.
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tion, and in the almost continuous judicial use of one or another version of the concept since the late nineteenth cen36
tury.'
Indeed, there is something distinctively American in John
Courtney Murray's We Hold These Truths. 3 7 Father John Murray argued that respect for natural law theory is a point of convergence between Catholicism and the U.S. political experiment. Americans can return to the commonplace of natural
law as a source of consensus about basic political and legal values because the American regime was founded in the eighteenth century upon that consensus. Father Murray, of course,
recognized that the philosophical particulars of the eighteenth
century are remote, if not obsolete, for most contemporary
Americans. Nevertheless, the expectation that the order of law
ought to be based upon natural principles ofjustice is a significant aspect of U.S. political and legal history, whatever shortcomings we might observe in the particular theories of natural
law reasoning employed in contemporary jurisprudence.13
Catholic theorists, like Jacques Maritain, looked to the American experience to rehabilitate political and legal convictions
about natural law. In fact, the Institute of International Law, in
its 1929 session held in New York, adopted an International
Declaration of the Rights of Man, that referred in passing to
the eighteenth century French Declaration of the Rights of
Man, but which included a preamble explicitly shaped around
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Maritain took this to be a model for such declara136. See U.S CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. For the role of natural law in the U.S.
founding and Constitution, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE HIGHER LAW BACKGROUND
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955) and LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 115 (2d ed. 1985) ("The Constitution talked about natural rights, and

it meant what it said."). On the abolitionist uses of the concept, see ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).

On the natural law background of the Congres-

sional debate over section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1988).

For the role of natural law in the nine-

teenth and twentieth century history of American law, see CHARLES GROVE HAINES,
THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930). Charles Grove Haines's book can
still be recommended as the most comprehensive account ofjudicial uses of natural
law theory. For a broad survey, including contemporary uses of natural law in issues
of privacy and abortion, see Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the American NaturalLaw
Tradition, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429 (1990).
137. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS ch. 13 (1960) ("The
Doctrine Lives").
138. See supra note 136.

1991-19921

STATE AND CENTESIMUS ANNUS

987

tions.13 9 In his later work, Man and the State, Maritain argued
for a "basic practical ideology," or what he termed a "secular
faith," regarding natural rights. 4 ° He hoped that an international consensus could be reached about these rights, notwithstanding dissensus over the philosophical principles which
might justify or explain them.' 4 ' In this, Maritain seemed to
assume that the American experience of practical consensus
about natural law could be extended to the international level.
In any case, the continual revival in America of natural law
not only as a "higher law," but as a rational basis for legislative
and judicial activities, is somewhat unique. The English legal
tradition has tended to mute the natural law.' 4 2 The English
positivist H.L.A. Hart, for example, retains some place for natural law, but it is reduced to the invariable conditions of survival that any system of law must bear in mind. It is, in short,
what we have called a kind of "lower law."' 43 Although some
U.S. jurists and legal theorists, like Oliver Wendell Holmes,
likewise reduced the natural law to psycho-physiological conditions, Justice Holmes himself recognized that the ordinary
1 44
meaning of natural law bespeaks a higher law of reason.
When Martin Luther King cited the natural law in defense of
civil disobedience, there was no question that he was referring
to a higher law that had been recognized throughout American
14 5
history.
The analysis of natural law and natural rights on the basis
of comparative legal cultures is an interesting subject that
139. International Declaration of the Rights of Man, Oct. 12, 1929, reprinted in
JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAw (Doris C. Anson trans.,

1971) (1943).
140. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 78 (1951). But see YVES R. SIMON,
THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW (1992) (introduction by Russell Hittinger).

141. Id.
142. For a comparative study of U.S. and English legal cultures, especially on
the theme of natural law, see P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING,
LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987).

143. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95 (1961).
144. In fact, Justice Holmes assumed that the term "natural law" refers to a
Kantian, or idealist, view of the human agent as an end in himself. OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, NATURAL LAW 313 (1920). On Justice Holmes' reaction to Immanuel Kant
and Georg Hegel, see Martin Golding, Holmes'sJurisprudence:Aspects of Its Development
and Continuity, 5 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 192 (1979).

145. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham Jail," in WHY WE CAN'T
(1963).
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would take us beyond the immediate interest of this Article.
Here, we simply make the point that although Centesimus develops a view of the political and legal order that has obvious affinities with the American ordo juris, the Pope does not appeal
to a natural law of rights as the underlying basis for consensus.
Rather, the Pope recalls Europeans to their cultural, linguistic,
and religious background. Europeans "are closely united in a
bond of common culture and an age-old history."' 4 6 Centesimus
Annus gravitates toward the historical, cultural, and religious
intelligibility of human nature. For example, the Pope writes:
Man is understood in a more complete way when he is situated within the sphere of culture through his language, history and the position he takes toward the fundamental
events of life such as birth, love, work and death. At the
heart of every culture lies the attitude man takes to the
greatest mystery: the mystery of God. Different cultures
are basically different ways of facing the question of personal existence. When this question is eliminated,
the cul47
ture and moral life of nations are corrupted.
Of course, the culturally and linguistically situated human
agent is reconcilable with some theories of natural law. Yet it
remains true that this Pope is more interested in discussing the
universal and transcendent facets of man through the cultural
and historical, and ultimately through the theological points of
view. 148
In the second place, it must be remembered that the Vatican was stung by the criticism that Humanae Vitae (1968) reduced the moral norms concerning birth control to a kind of
biologism. 149 Cardinal Ratzinger, who is more comfortable
with the scholastic language of natural law than is Pope John
Paul II, has nonetheless taken great pains to explain that natural law pertains to a "rational order" rather than to biological
necessities.' 5 0 Hence, we can speculate that the absence of
146.
147.
148.
Id. § 25.
149.

CA, supra note 5, § 27.
Id. § 24.
As the Pope says, the theological analysis "has great hermeneutical value."
For the best historical survey and philosophical study of natural law and

Humanae Vitae, see SMITH, supra note 54. '
150. Donum Vitae, Instruction on Respectfor Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity
of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day (Feb. 22, 1987); id., introduction,

3, at 8.
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natural law language in Centesimus reflects a rhetorical strategy
to avoid a reductionist construal of moral terms to the biological order. The strategy is evident in other Roman documents
and locutions. For example, in his remarks on the "Occasion
of the Tenth Anniversary of the Encyclical 'Pacem in Terris,'"
Cardinal Maurice Roy states that:
Although the term "nature" does in fact lend itself to serious misunderstandings, the reality intended has lost nothing of its forcefulness when it is replaced by modem synonym .... Such synonyms are: man, human being, human

person, dignity, the rights of man or the rights of peoples,
conscience, humaneness (in conduct), the struggle for justice, and, more recently, "the duty of being," the "quality of
life." Could they not all be summarized in the concept of
"values," which is very much used today?' 5 '
Whether the "misunderstandings" about the term "nature" can be alleviated by drawing from a menu of synonyms is
open to question. But the Pope's very muted use of natural
law concepts in his discussion of human rights represents a
more general tendency in Roman documents to avoid predi52
cating "law" of "nature." 1

Finally, and most importantly, the subject of rights is a
ready-made and widely accepted means of addressing the
problem of limits upon the political state. Alexander Passerin
d'Entrbves once said that "the real significance of natural law
must be sought in its function rather than in the doctrine itself." ' 5 3 Although this does not recommend itself as good advice for the philosopher who wishes to understand the doctriS15 1. Maurice Roy, Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Encyclical
"Pacem in Terris"
131 ("For

128 in THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 557; see id.

John XXIII, reference to nature also means defining peace as 'absolute respect for
the order laid down by God.' But here again, this word jars the modern mentality, as
does, even more, the idea that it summons up: a sort of complicated organic scheme
or gigantic genealogical tree, in which each being and group has its predetermined
place").
152. In contemporary Catholic natural law theory, this is not just a matter of
muting the rhetoric. See, e.g. JOHN FINNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980)
(systematically reformulating natural law tradition with only oblique reliance on any
philosophy of nature.); see my criticism, in A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW
THEORY

153.

(1987).

ALEXANDER PASSERIN D'ENTRVES, NATURAL LAW:
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 35 (2d ed. 1970).

AN INTRODUCTION TO
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nal issues,' 5 4 it is a shrewd way to cut through the often bewildering verbal protocols about natural law. Functionally
speaking, the purpose of natural rights discourse is the limitation of state power.' 5 5 This explains the Pope's use of natural
rights language. It fits hand in glove with his interest in liberal
political institutions. On this score, section twenty-nine of
Centesimus is important, for it summarizes very clearly the functional purpose of rights.
[In totalitarian regimes] man was compelled to submit to a
conception of reality imposed on him by coercion and not
reached by virtue of his own reason and the exercise of his
own freedom. This principle must be overturned and total
recognition must be given to the rights of the human conscience, which is bound to the truth, both natural and revealed. The recognition of these rights represents the primary 6foundation of every authentically free political or15
der.
The Pope gives three reasons for the urgency of the
rights-based approach to the political order. First, he believes
that the older forms of totalitarianism are not completely vanquished. Hence, he recommends that juridically recognized
rights be established while the opportunity is at hand. Second,
even in developed countries there is what the Pope calls "an
excessive promotion of purely utilitarian values."' 57 Because
the state will be tempted to resolve social, economic, and political crises on a merely utilitarian basis, it is crucial to erect
rights-based limits to governmental power. Third, and what is
perhaps most fascinating, the Pope worries about the problem
that "religious fundamentalism" will deny "to citizens of faiths
other than that of the majority the full exercise of their civil
58
and religious rights."
154. For a thoughtful criticism of the effort to use the language of natural law
and natural rights without reckoning with the philosophical issues, see supra note
141.
155. It is interesting, for example, that the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies
adopted a "Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms" on September 5, 1991. It
was a bill of rights that functioned as a provisional constitution. The first article
states: "Every person possesses natural, inalienable and inviolable rights and freedoms." N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at A5.
156. CA, supra note 5, § 29 (citation omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Section twenty-nine of Centesimus is one of the most extraordinary discussions in the encyclical. Among the mischiefs
against which rights are supposed to guard against, the Pope
underscores those caused by political majorities-either in the
name of utility, or in the name of religion. Hence, in addition
to the division of governmental powers, it is necessary to provide for individual rights as checks against what majorities can
effect through the government. We can recall that in section
forty-four, where he discusses the rule of law, he expressly said
that rights must be understood as inviolate against "even the
majority of a social body."' 59 It is the twofold approach to limits on government-structural and rights-based-that discloses
the close correspondence between Centesimus and the liberal
model.
Once again, it would be wrong to insinuate that the convergence between the Pope's discussion of rights and the standard liberal accounts of rights means that he operates from the
same philosophical premises. The Pope's sense of urgency for
the rights-based limits upon the state is shaped by his reading
of the historical events. It does not proceed from a thin account of the human good, advanced by liberal theorists like
John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin. t60 In section twenty-nine, the
Pope insists that the political order must "recognize and respect the hierarchy of the true values of human existence."
Read in context, and properly understood, the Pope does not
say that we need rights to protect ourselves against a hierarchy
of true values. Nor does he make anything resembling the
classically liberal argument that individuals must be protected
against society; rather, the argument is to protect citizens
against a state-sponsored preemption of those values. We
could imagine a civil situation in which basic issues of justice
and human flourishing are not treated in this language of juridical rights. But that is not the political world that Centesimus
Annus has in mind.
159. Id. § 44.
160. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism
in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 181 (1985). For a survey and analysis of what is sometimes called "anti-perfectionistic" liberalism, see GEORGE P. GRANT, ENGLISH-SPEAKING JUSTICE (1985); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982);
IAN SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTrION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY (1986); and RAZ, supra

note 22.
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CONCLUSION
The chief thesis of this Article is that Centesimus Annus
makes a decisive turn toward the liberal model of the state. It
appears that the Pope has worked his way toward this position
not on the basis of any particular liberal theory or theorist, but
rather through the crucible of a quite different historical experience. The view of the state in Centesimus is not drawn from
either the theory or practice of the democratic revolutions of
the eighteenth century. Rather, it is taken from the experience
of the totalitarian states of this century, which, in Eastern Europe and in the Third World, have ruined the institutional prerequisites of economic and political liberty far more extensively than did the despotic royalties of the ancien regime in
Western Europe. The convergence between these two historical experiences is remarkable. This encyclical gives us reason
to believe that the project of limited government is not bound
to the peculiar history and experience of Western Europe and
North America. Nor is its intelligibility necessarily bound to
the home-grown "liberal" philosophies of the West.
We have argued that the clearest achievement of Centesimus
is the Pope's reckoning with the problem of the modern state.
Whether we view the problem from our own historical experience, or whether we see it from the standpoint of the Pope's
view of the events in Eastern Europe of 1989, it is clear that
liberal political and legal institutions are a good, albeit imperfect, means of limiting the power of the state. John Paul is the
first modern pope to fully come to terms with this issue. While
it required him to set aside the older notion of the state as the
image of divine authority, he clearly understands that that
model does not square with modern political realities. Most
Catholics have lived in this century under the yoke of despotic
political regimes that have not borne the slightest resemblance
to the classical or medieval civitas.
Although we can only speculate about this, the Pope may
be making a bid to return to what he takes to be the original
source of European unity, the religious vision of human nature, while at the same time endorsing liberal political structures to protect the recovery of that vision. We should take the
Pope seriously when he says that religion is the key to culture.
Whereas Pope Leo XIII never compromised with respect to his
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understanding of the political civitas, John Paul does not compromise on his vision of a religious principle for cultural unity.
The principle of individual rights against political majorities,
the division of the organs of state power, the warning about
and limits on the welfare state need to be in place if the Catholic Church is to be about its mission of creating religiouslycentered cultures. He realizes that, even in Europe, the Catholicizing of the culture is a long-term project. Whatever inherent merits there are to liberal political institutions, they are
(like the Pax Romana) instrumentally valuable to the Church.
Nevertheless, there is a gamble in all of this. The Pope
left behind a philosophical approach that is not only familiar to
Catholics, but one which has much in its favor. Centesimus Annus does not reflect the elegant metaphysical scheme of Rerum
Novarum. Nor does it maintain the scholastic language that
shaped the thought of both conservative and progressive pontiffs over the past century. Whether this Pope's approach to
issues of human nature, law, and political society can match the
level of theoretical integration achieved in the older method is
yet to be seen. The philosophical imprecision of Centesimus is
not due to the fact that the Pope relies directly upon theology
when he articulates the ground of rights and duties in the
human person. Pope Leo's understanding of natural law was
no less theological. The difference between the two consists
principally in the traditional scholastic method that permitted
greater clarity of expression, and allowed its practitioner to indicate more precisely how one interrelates faith and reason,
grace and nature, and theology and philosophy. This encyclical leaves much to be desired in this respect.
The rights-based strategy for limiting the power of the
state harbors a number of potential problems which this encyclical does not address. It is one thing to set aside the older
natural law account of the state, but it is quite another thing to
argue for natural rights without some grounding in a doctrine
of natural law. Centesimus Annus seems to ground these rights
in a personalist-theological view of the human person, but
without any of the intermediate reasons traditionally associated with natural law. Do the declarations of international
bodies depend upon the theology of the Catholic Church, or
does the theology of the Church merely provide a clearer,
surer picture of the ground and end of human rights? This
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would seem to be an elementary philosophical issue. But, as
we have said, it is left hanging in the encyclical.
There is also the danger that the rights-language, without
the older metaphysical scheme, or at least without something
that plays the same role, will lead to the "thin" accounts of the

human good that are so typical of contemporary liberal
thought.' 6 ' The Pope insists that the relation between the
state and its citizens must be seen in terms of the "hierarchy of
the true values of human existence."1 62 However, a perplexing
issue must be faced in this regard. First, the encyclical does
not indicate with any philosophical precision which theory of
the correct hierarchy is suitable for legal enactment. Is it reasonable to expect the new democracies to enact a theological
conception of the hierarchy of values even as they adopt the
political and legal structures advocated by the encyclicalstructures that take the right to religious liberty as a "primary"
ground for limiting the state? 63 For example, the former
Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel recently said at Lehigh University that he is "in favor of a political system based
on the citizen, and recognizing all his fundamental civil and
human rights in their universal validity."' 164 The state, he said,
161. For two recent critical studies of the compatibility of modem rights discourse and the older natural law tradition, see Ralph Mclnerny, Natural Law and
Human Rights, 36 AM.J.JURIS. 1 (1991);James V. Schall, Human Rights as an Ideological
Project, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 47 (1987).
162. CA, supra note 5, § 29.
163. The Pope writes:
Nor does the church close her eyes to the danger of fanaticism or fundamentalism among those who, in the name of an ideology which purports to be
scientific or religious, claim the right to impose on others their own concept
of what is true and good. Christian truth is not of this kind. Since it is not
an ideology, the Christian faith does not presume to imprison changing sociopolitical realities in a rigid schema, and it recognizes that human life is
realized in history in conditions that are diverse and imperfect. Furthermore, in constantly reaffirming the transcendent dignity of the person, the
church's method is always that of respect for freedom.
CA, supra note 5, § 46 (citation omitted). Conceding to the Pope his claim that the
Christian faith is not an ideology, it nevertheless is a conception of the origin and end
of human beings. Can a non-ideological, though religious, conception of the truth
be rightfully legislated? To what extent can limits on the state explicitly include provisions which put the legislation of religious views out of bounds? The encyclical is
not entirely clear on these questions. The encyclical, for example, calls for a right to
"Sunday rest," a human rights "based on a commandment." Id. § 9.
164. Vaclav Havel, On Home, Address at Lehigh University (Oct. 26, 1991) in
38 N.Y. REV. BOOKs 49 (Dec. 5, 1991).
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must be based upon rights rather than "nationality" or "religion." The question, then, is whether the impetus toward
rights-based limits upon the state can practically be harmonized with the more traditional theological understanding of
values. Lists of rights-even supposing such rights to be objectively important-are not the same thing as a hierarchy of
values.' 6 In the North Atlantic world, efforts to make constitutional and legally considered lists of rights correspond to any
particular hierarchy of values have not met with great success.
The Pope might learn from U.S. historical and institutional experience, in which the all-purpose and vague notions
of natural rights have sometimes tended to subvert the appreciation of the common good. Given the Pope's strong endorsement of the rule of law, there is the related problem of
how to litigate, balance, and enforce all of these rights. While
Centesimus reflects a keen appreciation of institutional limits
upon the power of the state, the encyclical is not very illuminating on the institutional problems that attend the expansion
of rights claims by individuals. What, for instance, are the judicial and administrative implications of a right to "express one's
personality in the workplace"?' 66 Whatever meaning such a
right might have in Warsaw, it is apt to have a quite different
one in Malibu, California. How might the recognition of this
right affect the prospects of economic development and investment in the Third World? Might it not tend to expand rather
than limit the power of governmental bureaucracies?
Finally, the jury is still out as to whether the institutional
arrangements of liberal political regimes protect the cultural
and religious sphere envisaged by Pope John Paul II. Liberal
institutions are not neutral devices. Friedrich A. Hayek contended that "[a] Great Society has nothing to do with, and is in
fact irreconcilable with 'solidarity' in the true sense of unitedness in the pursuit of known common goals."' 6 7 According to
Professor Hayek, the chief common purpose of a liberal order
165. Immediately after the failed coup d'tat, the Soviet Congress of People's
Deputies adopted a "Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms." The first article
states: "Every person possess natural, inalienable and inviolable rights and freedoms." N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at A5.
166. CA, supra note 5, § 15.
167. 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 111 (1976) (citation omitted).
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"is the purely instrumental one of securing the formation of an
abstract order that has no specific purposes but will enhance
for all the prospects of achieving their respective purposes. ' '1 6"
Indeed, for Professor Hayek the traits which distinguish a liberal order from the "end-connected tribal society" are (1) the
rejection of the notion that the rule of law is not committed to
a "particular hierarchy binding upon the members," 69 and (2)
the recognition that the market "serves the multiplicity of
sepa- rate and incommensurable ends of all its separate members.""'7 This is not the place to engage Professor Hayek's philosophy at the level of detail that it deserves. But Professor
Hayek is surely correct to observe that the liberal view of political, legal, and economic institutions has broad implications for
the cultural sphere. While Centesimus goes further than previous encyclicals in distinguishing the ideal of solidarity from the
institutions of the political state, it certainly does not go so far
as Professor Hayek. Is it possible to enjoy the political, legal,
and economic institutions of what Professor Hayek calls the
"Great Society," without undermining or rendering irrelevant
the traditional conception of solidarity, culture, and religion?
In any event, the historical career of the Marxist state in
Eastern Europe is closed; the historical career of how these
peoples can forge an appropriate political and legal order is
still to be written. Centesimus takes the gamble of recommending new institutional ways to engage that project-ways
concerning which the Church has had relatively little experience. But given its much longer historical experience, and its
capacity to resist the degraded ideological baggage that frequently goes under the name of "liberalism," the Church
could prove to be a crucial force for the project of limited government.
168. Id. at 110.
169. Id. at 15.
170. Id. at 108.

